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Not too long ago, an academic symposium titled Taking 
Administrative Law to Tax would have been just that—academic. For 
decades, tax law sat comfortably isolated from administrative-law 
doctrines that governed other areas of law. For example, while 
administrative-law scholars and practitioners explored the contours of 
the Chevron doctrine and challenged agencies that did not observe 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements, tax kept plugging 
along, with its unique set of deference standards and general 
indifference to Treasury’s frequent APA violations. 
But things have now changed. Scholars in this Symposium, along 
with others, have successfully pushed the tax community to take a 
fresh look at long-overlooked administrative-law doctrines and 
explore how those doctrines may shape tax practice. Consequently, in 
recent years, courts have validated APA–based challenges to 
Treasury and IRS actions, when such challenges were not even on the 
radar screen a few years ago. 
Somewhat ironically, the biggest opening for challenges to 
Treasury and IRS actions came through a government victory. In 
Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States,1 
the Supreme Court rejected a taxpayer’s claim that tax-specific 
precedents governed the degree of deference owed to a Treasury 
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regulation.2 The Court instead “expressly ‘recognized’ the importance 
of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of 
administrative action” and would not “carve out an approach to 
administrative review good for tax law only.”3 Thus, consistent with 
the government’s arguments, the Court held that Chevron, and not 
National Muffler, provides the appropriate deference framework for 
Treasury regulations.4 
By so rejecting tax exceptionalism in the regulatory-deference 
context, the Court may have brought general administrative-law 
doctrines to several areas of tax administration, with possibly adverse 
consequences for the government. For example, under the APA, an 
agency generally must provide a reasoned explanation for its actions, 
or else face a challenge that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously under 
the APA. Although the reasoned-explanation requirement often 
proves manageable in the context of quasi-legislative functions (like 
rulemaking), Professor Steve Johnson, in his contribution to this 
Symposium, explains that the extension of this requirement to IRS 
adjudication could raise serious practical and policy problems for the 
IRS.5 Several statutes in the Internal Revenue Code require written 
determinations for various IRS adjudicative activities, including 
jeopardy determinations, collection due process determinations, trust 
fund recovery penalty determinations, and deficiency notices.6  
Practically speaking, it would be impossible for the IRS to 
provide an extensive explanation for each of these written 
determinations. Thus, if a robust reasoned-explanation requirement 
applies broadly to the IRS, much of the agency’s day-to-day work 
could be disregarded as arbitrary and capricious.7 Luckily, Professor 
Johnson concludes that both blackletter law and policy considerations 
militate against the extension of the APA’s reasoned-explanation 
requirement to most IRS determinations.8 However, Professor 
Johnson concludes that collection due process determinations do not 
warrant such an exception.9 If Professor Johnson is right, there could 
 
 2.  Id. at 713. 
 3.  Id. (some punctuation omitted). 
 4.  Id. at 712. 
 5.  Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771, 
1776–77 (2014). 
 6.  Id. at 1775–76. 
 7.  Id. at 1813. 
 8.  Id. at 1833–34. 
 9.  Id. 
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be significant consequences for the collection due process regime, and 
Professor Johnson’s arguments merit close attention. 
Although the broad extension of general administrative-law 
doctrines could pose challenges for some areas of tax administration, 
that extension seems perfectly appropriate when Congress uses the 
tax code to accomplish objectives unrelated to core tax policy. No one 
seriously doubts, for example, that the APA’s notice-and-comment 
requirements apply to the various agencies that prescribe labor 
regulations, political activity regulations, healthcare regulations, and 
so on. When the tax code contains a grant of regulatory authority 
related to those areas, the policy arguments for exceptions from the 
APA become especially weak—the mere placement of a labor statute 
in one title as opposed to another shouldn’t dramatically alter how 
the relevant agency head implements that statute. And in any event, 
the tax code contains only a few items unrelated to the core tax 
provisions, so applying the APA to nontax regulatory projects 
imposes a fairly small burden on Treasury and the IRS. 
Or so we all thought. In Administering the Tax System We Have, 
Professor Kristin Hickman acknowledges that the tax code is 
“routinely recognized as a tool in the regulatory toolbox.”10 Though 
Congress has long used the tax code for purposes other than revenue 
raising, “recent decades have seen a dramatic escalation”11 in this 
practice. And although conventional wisdom dictates that Treasury 
and the IRS generally treat nontax provisions as ancillary to the core 
tax provisions, Professor Hickman’s novel empirical research shows 
otherwise. Of 449 recent major rulemaking projects, a “substantial 
portion” relate to nontax policy objectives.12 This undeniably shows 
that Treasury and the IRS do, in fact, devote substantial resources 
towards administering nontax policies, and legislators concerned with 
the proper functioning of the IRS should take this into account as 
they inevitably burden the IRS with more tasks unrelated to the 
collection of revenue.13 
Courts should also take into account Professor Hickman’s 
empirical findings. Those findings may substantially alter current 
judicial attitudes towards pre-enforcement review of Treasury 
 
 10.  Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1726 
(2014). 
 11.  Id. at 1728. 
 12.  Id. at 1747. 
 13.  Id. at 1760–61. 
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regulations and the extent to which Treasury can enact retroactive 
rules. Although Professor Hickman leaves detailed analysis of these 
issues to her future scholarship, her contribution at this stage already 
provides the bedrock for informed and intelligent debate.14 
The new challenges and uncertainties facing Treasury 
rulemaking might leave one wondering whether Congress should take 
a more active role in setting tax policy. In A Case Study of Legislation 
vs. Regulation: Defining Political Campaign Intervention Under 
Federal Tax Law, Professor Ellen Aprill addresses this question 
against the backdrop of the so-called Tea Party scandal.15 That 
scandal, which involves allegations of improper targeting by the IRS 
of conservative advocacy groups, stems largely from the sad state of 
guidance under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), which grants an income tax 
exemption to social welfare organizations. Regulations implementing 
the statute nebulously allow any organization to claim the exemption 
“if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common 
good and general welfare of the people of the community.”16 All 
agree, or should agree, that this standard requires clarification. 
Reformers have proposed both legislative and regulatory 
changes, with many believing that a legislative response would give 
Treasury and the IRS the most flexibility needed to issue guidance.17 
But Professor Aprill astutely explains why the opposite might be so.18 
The breadth of the current statutory language provides substantial 
room for the tax agencies to issue and modify guidance as time 
passes. Yet, if Congress steps in and provides tighter definitions in § 
501(c)(4), any issued regulations could face the “risk that a court 
would hold them invalid as inconsistent with congressional intent.”19 
If one wants to ensure agency flexibility in this area (reasonable 
persons might disagree with that goal), Treasury should take the first 
step and issue final regulations under existing § 501(c)(4), and flesh 
out any ambiguities with other forms of guidance. Courts may more 
be more likely to validate agency guidance under this model than 
 
 14.  See id. at 1761 (noting that although her study was a preliminary analysis, the findings 
should undoubtedly “give some pause” to supporters of tax exceptionalism). 
 15.  Ellen P. Aprill, A Case Study of Legislation vs. Regulation: Defining Political 
Campaign Intervention Under Federal Tax Law, 63 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1641 (2014). 
 16.  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990). 
 17.  Aprill, supra note 15, at 1641. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
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under a regime in which guidance stems from a new, tightly worded § 
501(c)(4). 
Speaking of courts, Professor Leandra Lederman explores issues 
related to tax exceptionalism in the judicial context.20 Although 
federal appellate courts usually review legal questions decided by a 
trial court de novo, the Supreme Court, in Dobson v. Commissioner,21 
granted deference to the Tax Court on questions of tax law.22 
Congress seemingly overruled Dobson when it enacted a statute now 
codified in I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1), which directs courts to review Tax 
Court decisions “in the same manner and to the same extent as 
decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.”23 
Yet some believe that the statute leaves Dobson alone, insofar as 
review of legal questions go. Thus, an exceptional review standard 
would apply to questions of tax law—the Tax Court would receive 
deference for its legal conclusions, whereas the federal district courts 
and the Court of Federal Claims would not. 
Professor Lederman rejects that approach, showing that 
commentators who believe that the Dobson rule survived have 
misread the relevant legislative history. Nonetheless, even though 
Dobson may have been formally overruled, that case continues to 
cast a “long shadow.”24 Courts have not quickly embraced 
§ 7482(a)(1), and one still finds language in appellate court opinions 
suggesting that the Tax Court enjoys deference on legal questions. 
Arguably, policy concerns justify the courts’ practice in this regard. 
However, Professor Lederman examines those concerns and finds 
that an exceptional approach to the Tax Court is “completely 
unwarranted.”25 
Professor Lederman’s work highlights a possibly unintended 
consequence of Congress’s attempt to strengthen the Tax Court. In 
I.R.C. § 7441, Congress removed the Tax Court from the executive 
branch and placed it “under article I of the Constitution of the United 
 
 20.  Leandra Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835 
(2014). 
 21.  Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 (1983). 
 22.  See id. at 498–503 (explaining the congressional intent behind the formation of the Tax 
Court and stating that its findings should be disturbed only when they result from “a clear-cut 
mistake of law”). 
 23.  26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) (2012). 
 24.  Lederman, supra note 20, at 1868. 
 25.  Id. at 1893.  
GREWAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2014 9:12 AM 
1630 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1625 
States,”26 whatever that means.27 If Congress wanted to exalt the Tax 
Court through this denomination, its statute might have had the 
opposite effect. Had the Tax Court remained an agency, its 
administrative interpretations may have earned Chevron deference,28 
but as a trial court its legal interpretations earn none, aside from 
whatever’s left of Dobson. Of course, insofar as the Tax Court’s 
influence goes, whether Chevron applies reflects only one piece of the 
overall analysis. But Mayo’s rejection of tax exceptionalism 
complicates and possibly diminishes the Tax Court’s role vis-à-vis 
other government actors in the tax system. 
Returning to Mayo, the Court’s clear and unanimous rejection of 
tax exceptionalism might suggest that proponents of an exceptional 
approach were either excessively naïve or unabashedly imperious. 
But in A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative 
Procedure Act, Professor Bryan Camp shows that tax has actually 
been at the forefront of administrative law. As he writes, “The world 
of the APA started in 1947, but the world of U.S. tax administration 
began in 1789.”29 In fact, tax law confronted fundamental 
administrative-law questions long before other fields did. Thus, 
Professor Camp argues, the APA should not stand as the be-all and 
end-all for issues related to tax administration. Tax has a rich history, 
and that history can inform issues related to an agency’s authority to 
issue retroactive regulations,30 to the proper weight afforded different 
types of agency guidance,31 and so on. In other words, rather than 
 
 26.  26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2012). 
 27.  The idea that Congress can, through a statutory label, determine the constitutional role 
played by a government actor seems a bit strange. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
420 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt whether Congress can ‘locate’ an entity within one 
Branch or another for constitutional purposes by merely saying so.”). Nonetheless, in Freytag v. 
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), the Supreme Court accepted the concept of an Article I 
court. But the acceptance of that concept does not cure its inherent contradiction. (How about 
an Article III president? Or an Article II legislature?) Given the inherent contradiction 
between an Article I entity and the exercise of the Article III judicial power, litigation over the 
exact constitutional status of the Tax Court will continue. See generally Marie Sapirie, The 
Presidential Power To Remove Tax Court Judges, 137 TAX NOTES 459 (2012) (discussing the 
recent challenge to the President’s removal power over Tax Court judges and concluding that 
“much more might still be said about the Tax Court's constitutional status”). 
 28.  Lederman, supra note 20, at 1878–79. 
 29.  Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1684 (2014). 
 30.  Id. at 1709–10. 
 31.  Id. at 1700–06. 
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take administrative law to tax, maybe we should take tax to 
administrative law.32 
Professor Camp acknowledges that his approach reflects an 
inversion of the conventional wisdom. That is, to most, the APA 
reflects the general, overarching statute that governs administrative 
procedure, and specific statutes, like I.R.C. § 7805(b), reflect 
deviations or exceptions from the APA’s default framework. 
Professor Camp rejects this “top-down approach that presumes the 
APA is the primary source of law,”33 and instead concludes that “the 
proper place to start is with the precedents established in tax-
administration cases.”34 
To the extent that Professor Camp argues that tax and 
administrative law should include “a two-way conversation,”35 it’s 
hard to quibble with his analysis. Congress did not enact the APA in a 
vacuum, nor does the APA operate in one. Surely, courts should not 
turn a blind eye to the Internal Revenue Code or to the history of tax 
administration when applying the APA. But Professor Camp assumes 
a primacy of tax-specific authorities that might run counter to Mayo. 
One must eagerly await Professor Camp’s future scholarship that 
explores that issue and builds on the historical foundation he neatly 
lays here. 
Professor Lawrence Zelenak, in Maybe Just a Little Bit Special 
After All?, offers a more blunt (if qualified) critique of those who 
gleefully “danc[e] on the grave of tax exceptionalism.”36 It’s not just 
tax lawyers who believe tax is special, Professor Zelenak argues. 
Rather, pretty much everyone views tax as a “uniquely byzantine”37 
area of the law, and the frightening complexity of the Internal 
Revenue Code perhaps earns it some special treatment. 
It’s hard to dispute that the tax laws are difficult to understand, 
but the widespread recognition of that complexity probably stems 
more from the annual filing requirements than from tax law’s 
complexity vis-à-vis other areas of code-based law. If, à la the filing of 
a Form 1040, every individual had to annually determine the priority 
 
 32.  Id. at 1674. 
 33.  Id. at 1682. 
 34.  Id. at 1683. 
 35.  Id. at 1715. 
 36.  Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 1900 
(2014). 
 37.  Id. at 1908. 
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of her creditors’ claims under the bankruptcy code or had to measure 
her vehicle’s pollutants under the environmental laws, complaints 
about bankruptcy complexity or environmental complexity would 
permeate popular culture, just as complaints about the tax laws do. 
And although many lawyers express fear of tax even outside of the 
filing context—in shying away from enrolling in tax courses during 
law school, for example38—that probably has more to do with the 
heavy focus of the common law tradition than tax law’s unique 
complexity. That is, the law school curriculum, especially during the 
first year, displays a heavy bias towards reading judicial opinions and 
away from careful statutory analysis. Thus, in their formative first 
year, law students are taught to view the world through the lens of an 
English common law judge,39 and they naturally come to believe that 
tax, with its focus on statutory and regulatory interpretation, reflects a 
quirky and unique body of law. 
In the end, the relationship between tax complexity and tax 
exceptionalism remains open for debate, but Professor Zelenak 
skillfully presents other defenses of tax exceptionalism. The grave 
dancers, Professor Zelenak argues, should recognize that tax is hardly 
unique in claiming some degree of exceptionalism. Specialists in any 
field tend to think that their area is, well, special.40 In this way, “there 
is nothing exceptional about tax exceptionalism.”41 And even if broad 
issues like agency deference standards do not merit tax-specific rules, 
that hardly eliminates the justification for limited forms of tax 
exceptionalism in other contexts.42 Professor Zelenak argues, for 
example, that there is nothing necessarily exceptional about 
interpreting technical tax statutes differently from vague antitrust 
statutes. The different interpretive methods may flow from the 
application of a general principle (for example, reading detailed 
statutes differently than vague ones),43 rather than a deliberate effort 
to carve out unique interpretive methodologies for tax alone. Viewed 
this way, the “anti” tax exceptionalists overstate the extent to which 
 
 38.  See id. at 1908. 
 39.  See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 7 (1998) (“[The case method] explains why first-year law school is so exhilarating: because 
it consists of playing common-law judge, which in turn consists of playing king—devising, out of 
the brilliance of one's own mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind.”). 
 40.  See Zelenak, supra note 36, at 1909–10. 
 41.  Id. at 1910. 
 42.  Id. at 1919. 
 43.  Id. at 1916.  
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tax departs from general principles, especially in the statutory 
interpretation area. 
In reading Professor Zelenak’s contribution and the other 
Articles in this Symposium, one finds himself hopelessly conflicted. 
On the one hand, each Article presents forceful arguments, and the 
reader will find himself agreeing with much of what each author says. 
On the other hand, each Article reflects a unique viewpoint that may 
stand in tension with some of the others. Mayo’s rejection of tax 
exceptionalism thus has not ended debate regarding the relationship 
between tax law and administrative law. Instead, the case may have 
just started the conversation. Tax and administrative-law scholars 
should both thank the Duke Law Journal for opening the dialogue. 
 
